Exit and voice: a game-theoretic analysis of customer complaint management

We develop a multi-agent communication model with participation decisions to address the customer complaining behavior and the corresponding management policy. Privately informed customers choose among costly complain, keep silence, and exit, and a firm decides complaining barriers and whether to undertake a corrective action. It is shown that customers truthfully complain only under a moderate complaining barrier. The observed low complaint/dissatisfaction ratio and costly complaint arise as one equilibrium outcome. Customers' expectations, the precision of signals, and the temptation of outside options are identified as the determinants of complaint management policy. Firms are likely to set socially excessive complaining barriers

Exit and voice: a game-theoretic analysis of customer complaint management

We develop a multi-agent communication model with participation decisions to address the customer complaining behavior and the corresponding management policy. Privately informed customers choose among costly complain, keep silence, and exit, and a firm decides complaining barriers and whether to undertake a corrective action. It is shown that customers truthfully complain only under a moderate complaining barrier. The observed low complaint/dissatisfaction ratio and costly complaint arise as one equilibrium outcome. Customers' expectations, the precision of signals, and the temptation of outside options are identified as the determinants of complaint management policy. Firms are likely to set socially excessive complaining barriers

Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary

This paper studies the optimal design of delegation rule in a three-tier principal-intermediary-agent hierarchy. In this hierarchy, monetary transfer is not feasible, delegation is made sequentially, and all players are strategic. We characterize the optimal delegation mechanism. It is shown that the single-interval delegation a la Holmstrom is optimal only when the intermediary is moderately biased. Otherwise, as responses to the distortion caused by a biased intermediary, the optimal delegation set may involve a hole. Thus, multi-interval delegation set would arise when subordinates have opposing biases. This result sheds some light on policy threshold effects: "slight" changes in the underlying state cause a jump in the policy responses

Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary

This paper studies the optimal design of delegation rule in a three-tier principal-intermediary-agent hierarchy. In this hierarchy, monetary transfer is not feasible, delegation is made sequentially, and all players are strategic. We characterize the optimal delegation mechanism. It is shown that the single-interval delegation a la Holmstrom is optimal only when the intermediary is moderately biased. Otherwise, as responses to the distortion caused by a biased intermediary, the optimal delegation set may involve a hole. Thus, multi-interval delegation set would arise when subordinates have opposing biases. This result sheds some light on policy threshold effects: "slight" changes in the underlying state cause a jump in the policy responses

Love me, love my dog: an experimental study on social connections and indirect reciprocity

This paper conducts a laboratory experiment to investigate the role of social connections in behavioral indirect reciprocity. We provide the evidence of spillovers effects of social ties, e.g., the recipient’s indirect reciprocal act varies with the relations between the donor and a third party. Naturally occurring friendship is employed to study social connections. Thus, a beneficiary might either be a “friend” or a “stranger” of the donor. We demonstrate that knowing social connections significantly increases the recipient’s repayment only if the donor is kind enough in the first place. Overall, recipients’ indirect reciprocity almost doubles when introducing social networks among donors and beneficiaries. It is also shown that this spillovers effect is unlikely the result of recipients’ perception of donors’ expectations. Major theories of social preferences, e.g., fairness, intention-based, guilt-aversion, cannot offer satisfactory explanations of our findings. We propose an explanation based on in-group and out-group differences but with endogenous group status, in which social connections play a crucial role

Love me, love my dog: an experimental study on social connections and indirect reciprocity

This paper conducts a laboratory experiment to investigate the role of social connections in behavioral indirect reciprocity. We provide the evidence of spillovers effects of social ties, e.g., the recipient’s indirect reciprocal act varies with the relations between the donor and a third party. Naturally occurring friendship is employed to study social connections. Thus, a beneficiary might either be a “friend” or a “stranger” of the donor. We demonstrate that knowing social connections significantly increases the recipient’s repayment only if the donor is kind enough in the first place. Overall, recipients’ indirect reciprocity almost doubles when introducing social networks among donors and beneficiaries. It is also shown that this spillovers effect is unlikely the result of recipients’ perception of donors’ expectations. Major theories of social preferences, e.g., fairness, intention-based, guilt-aversion, cannot offer satisfactory explanations of our findings. We propose an explanation based on in-group and out-group differences but with endogenous group status, in which social connections play a crucial role

Can higher levels of disclosure bring greater efficiency: Empirical research on the effect of government information disclosure on enterprise investment efficiency

Government Information disclosure (GID) is an important part of Chinese efforts in improving doing-business environment. Based on the sample of China's listed enterprises, this paper studies the effect of government information disclosure on enterprise investment efficiency. We find that GID significantly improves enterprise investment efficiency, and this effect is stronger for non-SOE, and enterprises in regulated industries. Mechanism analysis suggests that when policy uncertainty is higher, the promotion effect of GID on enterprise investment efficiency is stronger. The analysis based on enterprises' survey data shows that the higher level of GID is associated with the lower enterprises' perception of policy uncertainty. These suggest that GID improves enterprise investment efficiency and raise the doing-business environment by reducing policy uncertainty

Potential risk to water resources under eco-restoration policy and global change in the Tibetan Plateau

Water shortage is a core problem that has hindered sustainable development worldwide. The Tibetan Plateau feeds ten main rivers on which almost 20% of the world’s population depends. However, the plateau has suffered serious environmental deterioration from global warming. Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has supported ecological restoration in the Tibetan Plateau, mainly by promoting large-scale afforestation and grassland conservation. To identify the impact of global change and ecological restoration policy on the plateau, we used geographic information system (GIS) methodologies to study changes to the water supplies in the region as a result of implemented restoration programs. Moreover, we also used GIS to assess the potential risks of these changes for the long-term sustainability of water supplies. Our findings show that the quantity of water supplies in the Tibetan Plateau has increased over the last 36 years; this was attributed to an increase in precipitation as well as increasing glacial meltwater due to global warming. We also found that the water consumption associated with afforestation projects reduced the water yield, in that it was altered by the artificial establishment of plant communities, with different afforestation projects variously impacting water consumption. The potential risk areas in the plateau were mainly distributed in areas with dense human populations and villages, and intensive human activities around forest shrubs where ecological restoration programs had been largely implemented. We highlight the need for ecosystem management and monitoring within larger afforestation programs, which should include the planting of vegetation with low rates of water consumption